理赔欺诈
1. 简介
索赔欺诈,尤其是虚构的人身伤害索赔,每年给保险公司造成数十亿美元的损失,并抬高了诚实客户的保费。传统的欺诈检测手段缓慢且不准确。图数据库通过可视化索赔人、医疗记录和社交媒体之间复杂的关联,为解决这一问题提供了方案。这能够揭示暗示欺诈的不一致之处,例如索赔人声称受重伤却无任何医疗记录。通过使用图数据库,保险公司可以更好地检测欺诈、保护财务资产,并确保资源流向真正需要的人。
2. 应用场景
3. 解决方案
图数据库为检测欺诈提供了一种新方法。利用图论,它们不仅准确,而且能够对实体之间复杂的关系和模式进行建模。图模型能够表示实体及其关系,例如客户账户、交易及其关联。
使用图数据库进行欺诈检测具有多项优势:
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增强的欺诈检测:可视化客户互动可以揭示隐藏的欺诈模式
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实时分析:图数据库支持实时监控,从而更快地响应欺诈行为
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提高准确性:相比传统数据库,图数据库能更准确地识别模式和异常
4. 建模
本节提供了一些 Cypher 查询示例,以展示如何构建数据以及在现实场景中查询的样子。示例图将包含个人、医疗专业人员、索赔、车辆及其他相关实体的节点,以及如 HAS_CLAIM(拥有索赔)、TREATED_BY(由...治疗)、INVOLVED_IN(参与)等关系,以展示实体间的连接方式。
4.1. 数据模型
4.1.1 必填字段
Claimant(索赔人)节点
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name:索赔人的姓名
MedicalProfessional(医疗专业人员)节点
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name:医疗专业人员的姓名
Claim(索赔)节点
-
claimID:索赔的唯一标识符 -
date:索赔日期 -
amountClaimed:索赔金额
Vehicle(车辆)节点
-
VIN:车辆识别代号
关系
(Claimant)-[:HAS_CLAIM]->(Claim)
(Claim)-[:TREATED_BY]->(MedicalProfessional)
(Claimant)-[:OWNS]->(Vehicle)
(Vehicle)-[:INVOLVED_IN]->(Claim)
(MedicalProfessional)-[:TREATS]->(Claimant)
4.2. 演示数据
以下 Cypher 语句将在 Neo4j 数据库中创建示例图:
//
// 1. Create Claimants
//
CREATE (c1:Claimant {name: "John Doe"})
CREATE (c2:Claimant {name: "Jane Smith"})
CREATE (c3:Claimant {name: "Bob Johnson"})
//
// 2. Create Medical Professionals
//
CREATE (m1:MedicalProfessional {name: "Dr. Gregory House"})
CREATE (m2:MedicalProfessional {name: "Dr. John Watson"})
//
// 3. Create Vehicles
//
CREATE (v1:Vehicle {VIN: "VIN-12345"})
CREATE (v2:Vehicle {VIN: "VIN-67890"})
CREATE (v3:Vehicle {VIN: "VIN-111213"})
//
// 4. Create Claims
//
CREATE (cl1:Claim {claimID: "CL100", date: date("2025-01-01"), amountClaimed: 5000})
CREATE (cl2:Claim {claimID: "CL101", date: date("2025-01-05"), amountClaimed: 2000})
CREATE (cl3:Claim {claimID: "CL102", date: date("2025-01-10"), amountClaimed: 10000})
CREATE (cl4:Claim {claimID: "CL103", date: date("2025-01-12"), amountClaimed: 8000})
//
// 5. Establish Relationships
//
// John Doe has claim CL100, treated by Dr. House.
// John Doe owns VIN-12345, which was involved in CL100.
CREATE (c1)-[:HAS_CLAIM]->(cl1)
CREATE (cl1)-[:TREATED_BY]->(m1)
CREATE (c1)-[:OWNS]->(v1)
CREATE (v1)-[:INVOLVED_IN]->(cl1)
CREATE (m1)-[:TREATS]->(c1)
// Jane Smith has claim CL101, treated by Dr. Watson.
// Jane Smith owns VIN-67890, which was involved in CL101.
CREATE (c2)-[:HAS_CLAIM]->(cl2)
CREATE (cl2)-[:TREATED_BY]->(m2)
CREATE (c2)-[:OWNS]->(v2)
CREATE (v2)-[:INVOLVED_IN]->(cl2)
CREATE (m2)-[:TREATS]->(c2)
// Bob Johnson has claim CL102, treated by Dr. Watson.
// Bob Johnson owns VIN-111213, which was involved in CL102.
CREATE (c3)-[:HAS_CLAIM]->(cl3)
CREATE (cl3)-[:TREATED_BY]->(m2)
CREATE (c3)-[:OWNS]->(v3)
CREATE (v3)-[:INVOLVED_IN]->(cl3)
CREATE (m2)-[:TREATS]->(c3)
// Create a second claim for John Doe (CL103),
// which is also treated by Dr. House and involves the same vehicle VIN-12345.
CREATE (c1)-[:HAS_CLAIM]->(cl4)
CREATE (cl4)-[:TREATED_BY]->(m1)
CREATE (v1)-[:INVOLVED_IN]->(cl4)
CREATE (m1)-[:TREATS]->(c1)
5. Cypher 查询
5.1. 识别具有多项索赔的索赔人
在此查询中,我们将识别提出多项索赔的索赔人,因为多项索赔有时可能是欺诈的一个危险信号。
查看图表
MATCH path=(c:Claimant)-[:HAS_CLAIM]->(cl:Claim)
WITH c, count(cl) AS numClaims
WHERE numClaims > 1
RETURN path
查看统计数据
MATCH (m:MedicalProfessional)<-[:TREATED_BY]-(cl:Claim)
WITH m, count(cl) AS claimCount, sum(cl.amountClaimed) AS totalAmount
WHERE claimCount > 1 OR totalAmount > 5000
RETURN m.name AS MedicalProfessional, claimCount, totalAmount
ORDER BY totalAmount DESC
5.2. 识别具有异常模式的医疗专业人员
发现那些在索赔中出现频率异常高,或与极高索赔总额相关的医生或医疗专业人员。
查看图表
MATCH path=(m:MedicalProfessional)<-[:TREATED_BY]-(cl:Claim)
WITH m, count(cl) AS claimCount, sum(cl.amountClaimed) AS totalAmount, path
WHERE claimCount > 1 OR totalAmount > 5000
RETURN path
返回统计数据
MATCH (m:MedicalProfessional)<-[:TREATED_BY]-(cl:Claim)
WITH m, count(cl) AS claimCount, sum(cl.amountClaimed) AS totalAmount
WHERE claimCount > 1 OR totalAmount > 5000
RETURN m.name AS MedicalProfessional, claimCount, totalAmount
ORDER BY totalAmount DESC
5.3. 识别潜在的“制造碰撞以获利”骗局
“制造碰撞以获利”骗局通常涉及伪造事故,其中同一辆车或同一伙人会反复出现在多个索赔中。一个简单的模式是:* 同一辆车涉及多个索赔,且索赔人不同,或索赔日期/金额存在疑点。
查看图表
MATCH (v:Vehicle)-[:INVOLVED_IN]->(cl:Claim)
WITH v, collect(cl) AS allClaims
WHERE size(allClaims) > 1
UNWIND allClaims AS claim
MATCH path=(v)-[:INVOLVED_IN]->(claim)
RETURN path
返回统计数据
MATCH (v:Vehicle)-[:INVOLVED_IN]->(cl:Claim)
WITH v, count(cl) AS claimCount
WHERE claimCount > 1
RETURN v.VIN AS Vehicle, claimCount
6. 图数据科学 (GDS)
图数据科学 (GDS) 通过分析网络结构和模式,为高级欺诈检测提供强大的算法。在此,我们探讨关键算法及其在保险欺诈检测中的应用。
6.1. 图投影
在运行任何 GDS 算法之前,必须创建一个图投影。投影是内存中图的副本,经过优化以进行分析处理。
6.1.1. 基础投影
这是一个基础投影,包含我们欺诈检测图中的所有节点类型和关系。
CALL gds.graph.project(
'fraud-graph',
// Node labels to include
['Claimant', 'MedicalProfessional', 'Claim', 'Vehicle'],
// Relationship types to include
{
HAS_CLAIM: {orientation: 'UNDIRECTED'},
TREATED_BY: {orientation: 'UNDIRECTED'},
OWNS: {orientation: 'UNDIRECTED'},
INVOLVED_IN: {orientation: 'UNDIRECTED'}
}
);
6.3. 中心度算法
中心度算法有助于识别网络中最具影响力或最可疑的节点。
6.3.1. PageRank
PageRank 有助于识别欺诈网络中的关键角色。
CALL gds.pageRank.stream('fraud-graph')
YIELD nodeId, score
RETURN gds.util.asNode(nodeId).name AS name, score
ORDER BY score DESC
这能揭示:* 与索赔关联度异常高的医疗专业人员 * 处于多个欺诈计划核心的索赔人 * 经常涉及可疑索赔的车辆。
6.3.2. 中介中心度 (Betweenness Centrality)
识别作为不同社区之间桥梁的节点。
CALL gds.betweenness.stream('fraud-graph')
YIELD nodeId, score
WITH gds.util.asNode(nodeId) as node, score
RETURN
labels(node)[0] as type,
CASE labels(node)[0]
WHEN 'Claimant' THEN node.name
WHEN 'MedicalProfessional' THEN node.name
WHEN 'Claim' THEN node.claimID
WHEN 'Vehicle' THEN node.VIN
ELSE 'Unknown'
END as identifier,
score as betweenness_score
ORDER BY score DESC
LIMIT 20;
此分析揭示:* 欺诈网络中的关键中介(高中介分值)* 连接本来不相关的群体的实体 * 潜在的欺诈团伙协调者 * 连接不同索赔人组的医疗专业人员。
6.4. 节点相似度
节点相似度算法有助于识别可能暗示欺诈行为的模式。
6.4.1. Node2Vec
Node2Vec 生成可用于衡量节点相似度的向量嵌入。以下是如何有效地使用它。
// First, generate and store embeddings
CALL gds.node2vec.write('fraud-graph', {
embeddingDimension: 128,
walkLength: 80,
walksPerNode: 10,
writeProperty: 'embedding'
})
YIELD nodePropertiesWritten;
// Then find similar nodes using cosine similarity
// For example, find claimants similar to 'John Doe'
MATCH (source:Claimant {name: 'John Doe'})
MATCH (other:Claimant)
WHERE other <> source
WITH source, other,
gds.similarity.cosine(source.embedding, other.embedding) AS similarity
RETURN other.name AS similar_claimant,
similarity
ORDER BY similarity DESC
LIMIT 5;
该方法有助于识别:* 行为模式相似的索赔人组 * 患者网络相似的医疗专业人员 * 具有可疑共同特征的索赔 * 基于行为相似性的潜在欺诈团伙。
6.5. 弱连通分量 (WCC)
WCC 有助于识别潜在欺诈活动的孤立簇。
// First identify the components
CALL gds.wcc.stream('fraud-graph')
YIELD nodeId, componentId
WITH gds.util.asNode(nodeId) as node, componentId
// Group by component and collect node information
WITH componentId,
collect(DISTINCT labels(node)[0]) as nodeTypes,
count(*) as componentSize,
collect(DISTINCT
CASE labels(node)[0]
WHEN 'Claimant' THEN node.name
WHEN 'MedicalProfessional' THEN node.name
WHEN 'Claim' THEN node.claimID
WHEN 'Vehicle' THEN node.VIN
ELSE null
END
) as entities
// Filter out null values and return meaningful information
WITH componentId,
componentSize,
nodeTypes,
[x IN entities WHERE x IS NOT NULL] as connectedEntities
RETURN
componentId,
componentSize as size,
nodeTypes as types,
connectedEntities as entities
ORDER BY size DESC
LIMIT 10;
此查询提供:
-
componentId:每个连通分量的唯一标识符 -
size:分量中的节点数 -
types:分量中存在的节点类型(索赔人、索赔、车辆等) -
entities:分量中可识别的实体列表(姓名、索赔 ID、VIN)
这些 GDS 算法为以下方面提供了强大工具:
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识别索赔中的可疑模式
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检测有组织的欺诈团伙
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衡量实体间联系的强度
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发现看似无关的索赔之间隐藏的关系